We’ve discussed how SCOTUS handled discrimination by expanding Congress’ commerce powers instead of utilizing the Equal Protection Clause 🤯🤦in the Heart of Atlanta Motel case. In Katzenbach v McClung (1964), SCOTUS made it even worse. In McClung, Ollie’s BBQ restaurant in Birmingham, AL, would not serve black patrons. Unlike the Heart of Atlanta Motel, though, Ollie’s did not serve out of state customers. Nonetheless, SCOTUS found “that a substantial portion of the food served in the restaurant had moved in interstate commerce,” thus, Congress was allowed to regulate the restaurant under the Commerce Clause. Here, SCOTUS held Congress had jurisdiction to regulate local activity that utilized items that had previously traveled in interstate commerce. Congress often relies on these expanded “powers” when regulating local conduct to this day. So, while prohibiting racial discrimination was a good thing, expanding Congress’ commerce powers beyond true constitutional authority was a constitutional catastrophe!

Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, addresses discrimination in public accommodations. The Heart of Atlanta Motel refused to rent rooms to black patrons. Its owner challenged the constitutionality of Title II, arguing Congress lacked authority to prohibit segregation in a local motel. In Heart of Atlanta Motel v US (1964), SCOTUS rejected that claim – but not for the reasons you’d think! They ruled Congress has the authority to prohibit discrimination in public accommodations . . . under the Commerce Clause of the US Constitution 🤔🤷. Their reasoning expanded the authority of Congress under the Commerce Clause beyond its plain language of “regulat[ing] Commerce . . .among the several States,” but that’s not the worst part. Only 1 Justice determined Congress could enact the Civil Rights Act under its 14th Amendment authority! The rest held it could not! More on this insanity at https://wp.me/pecX6i-4cq

The Agricultural Adjustment Act restricted the amount of wheat farmers like Rosco Filburn could grow as a means to increase prices, thereby benefiting farmers. Filburn grew more than his quota, using the “extra” to feed his own livestock at a lower cost. He then benefited by selling his “quota” wheat at market for a higher price. In Wickard v Filburn (1942), SCOTUS acknowledged Filburn’s small amount of locally consumed wheat did not by itself substantially effect interstate commerce. Yet when all of the locally consumed wheat Nationwide is considered together, in the aggregate, those intra-state activities substantially effect interstate commerce. Thus, Congress was allowed to stop Filburn from growing the extra wheat to feed his family & livestock. Although this case is mostly still binding precedent, the fact remains the Constitution only allows Congress to regulate commerce. A man growing wheat to feed his family & livestock is not commerce. Any holding to the contrary stretches the term into absurdity.

In recent weeks, we’ve discussed cases where SCOTUS held Congress could only regulate local activity that had a “direct” effect on INTERstate commerce. But US v Darby (1941) changed that, where SCOTUS held Congress can regulate local activity if it merely has a substantial effect on interstate commerce – even if the local activity itself is NOT commerce. While this is an alarming expansion of Congress’ “power to regulate commerce,” that’s not all. The Act in question “also sets up an administrative procedure whereby those standards may from time to time be modified generally as to industries subject to the Act or within an industry in accordance with specified standards, by an administrator acting in collaboration with ‘Industry Committees’ appointed by him.” So, people appointed within the Executive Branch are “allowed” to make substantive changes to the law, and SCOTUS never questioned that blatant violation of the separation of powers.